Fullerton operates 19 Flock cameras around the city. But these cameras are part of a much larger law-enforcement network, allowing authorized agencies across California to include Fullerton’s data in searches conducted far outside the city.

Many searches reviewed covered hundreds of participating camera networks at once. The stated reasons range from ordinary criminal investigations to searches referencing federal agencies, immigration protests and instructions for officers to “develop probable cause.”

The records do not show that every search returned a result from a Fullerton camera, nor do unusual search descriptions by themselves establish misconduct. But they offer a window into how broadly a locally operated camera network can be used once it shares its data with other agencies.

Fullerton Police has consistently emphasized that federal and out-of-state agencies cannot directly access the city’s Flock data. Department policy also prohibits releasing the information for immigration enforcement. The audit, however, contains searches conducted by California agencies with reasons referencing Homeland Security Investigations, Customs and Border Protection, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and Operation Stonegarden, a federal border-security grant program. Most of those searches covered hundreds of participating networks. 

Police Chief Jon Radus said that does not necessarily violate Fullerton’s restrictions. According to Radus, an authorized California investigator assigned to a joint law-enforcement task force may access Fullerton’s system for a legitimate investigation, such as one involving drug trafficking, human trafficking or violent crime, so long as the use is permitted by law and department policy and is not for immigration enforcement. In other words, barring federal agencies from directly logging into Fullerton’s system does not mean Fullerton camera data cannot be used in an investigation involving federal partners.

Flock told California agencies it applied keyword filters related to immigration enforcement or reproductive care in July 2025. But Radus acknowledged a limitation to those controls. “Restricting access to authorized agencies is different from determining the actual purpose behind every search,” Radus wrote. He also said that once an authorized user obtains information, access controls cannot guarantee that the user will never improperly disclose it. Such a disclosure, he said, would remain unauthorized and could be subject to corrective action.

Other entries provide much less explanation. On February 2, 2025, Escondido Police conducted three searches with the stated reason “Immigration Protest.” Each included 414 participating networks, and the case-number field was blank. The audit also contains San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department searches labeled “ICE PROTEST.”

Those descriptions do not establish that police were searching for people simply because they participated in a protest, as they could have been connected to a crime or public-safety issue arising at a demonstration.

The records, however, do not explain what conduct prompted the searches or whose vehicle was being sought. Radus provided additional context for a separate set of 14 Anaheim Police searches whose reason was simply listed as “ICE.” He said the June 12, 2025 searches stemmed from reports that vehicles were chasing people in an Anaheim park and that people may have been kidnapped. The vehicles turned out to belong to ICE agents who had not notified Anaheim police of their activity in the city, Radus said. He added that the Anaheim officer should have used a different or more detailed explanation.

The logs also contain numerous searches with instructions such as “develop PC,” “develop own PC,” or “develop probable cause.”

One Napa County Sheriff’s Department entry reads:

“10851 association, develop PC and stop, there is no wants.”

Radus said the language can reflect a legitimate investigation where police are interested in a vehicle but do not yet have sufficient grounds to stop it. “A legitimate investigation may involve locating a vehicle before officers have sufficient grounds to stop it,” he wrote.

According to Radus, locating a vehicle and detaining its occupants are separate actions. Officers must still have an independent legal basis for any stop, and a Flock result or instruction to “develop PC” does not by itself provide that justification.

This does not mean that Flock itself is being used to create probable cause. Instead, it is showing another way the system can be used: investigators can search camera records to help locate a vehicle they are already interested in even when the information prompting the search is not enough, on its own, to justify stopping that vehicle.

Fullerton’s own policy reflects the same approach. It states that reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR).

Fullerton staff says additional safeguards are now in place. The current staff report says users must enter a related case number and reason before conducting a search. Authorized users must receive training, and Fullerton conducts quarterly audits of the system.

The documents also differ on how long the department keeps data. The staff report and Flock contracts set a 30-day retention period, while the department’s published policy says ALPR data should be stored for a minimum of one year.

Many of the records reviewed are from 2025, and some current restrictions may not have operated in the same way at the time. The audit therefore does not show that every historical search would still be possible against Fullerton’s cameras today.

What it does show is the scale of the network Fullerton participates in. The city may own only 19 Flock cameras, but their usefulness is not confined to investigations conducted by Fullerton Police. Authorized agencies elsewhere in California can search a much larger shared network that includes Fullerton, including in investigations involving federal task forces and vehicles with no immediate connection to Fullerton itself.

That broader access, and how much control Fullerton retains over the eventual use of its data, is one of the questions councilmembers will have in front of them Tuesday, October 6, 2026. The meeting begins at 5:30 pm in the Council Chamber, 303 W. Commonwealth Ave. 

Other ways to get involved:

The meeting streams at fullerton.legistar.com and airs on Spectrum Channel 3 and AT&T U-verse Channel 99. Remote commenters can join via Zoom, meeting ID 160 256 5242, or by phone at 669-254-5252. Written comments may be emailed to CouncilMembers@cityoffullerton.com with the item number in the subject line.