What Fullerton Police Publish About Their Own Cameras

By Emma Garcia Benson on August 24, 2026 • ( 1 Comment )

This article explains how the Fullerton Police department uses various types of cameras, including License Plate Readers (LPRs), body-worn cameras, and drones, based on publicly available information from the City and Police Department’s websites.

1. License Plate Readers: The department has Flock Safety cameras installed in certain locations. These cameras help with crime investigations, monitor public areas, and send real-time alerts about vehicles linked to criminal activity.

2. Body-Worn Cameras: All patrol officers wear body cameras that record audio and video during their interactions. The main goals are to improve accountability, document situations like field sobriety tests and use-of-force incidents, and make evidence collection easier.

Drones used by the department capture aerial videos and photos, which follow the same storage rules as body camera footage. This means the footage from both types of cameras is treated similarly in terms of how long it is kept.

The department aims to gather evidence while respecting people’s privacy. It mentions two main uses for the cameras: investigating past crimes and receiving alerts about vehicles of interest.

The Fullerton Police Department emphasizes transparency and responsible use of these technologies. They encourage community members to visit their transparency portal for more information. Here are some key points from the information provided:

– What is detected: license plates and vehicles.
– What is not detected: facial features, people, and characteristics like gender or race.
– The police department’s data is only used for law enforcement and is not sold to outside parties.
– They do not use this technology for immigration or traffic enforcement, which is important because traffic stops make up a lot of police interactions in California.
– Any alerts from the vehicle hotlist must be verified by a person before police action is taken.

The department states that it owns the data collected, but it does not clarify where this data is stored, who manages it, or the terms of agreements with vendors. Ownership of the data differs from physical control, and the webpage does not address that distinction.

A recent analysis of a department’s Access Policy has revealed significant gaps in how data is used. The policy states that all access to data must have a “valid reason,” but it does not clearly define what this means. It is also unclear who decides whether a reason is valid, how that decision is made, or whether the reasons are ever reviewed. Recording access reasons without checking them does little to ensure proper control.

The policy lists prohibited uses of the system but lacks an enforcement plan. It does not explain what happens if someone violates these rules or how violations are detected. Simply listing prohibitions is not enough to ensure compliance.

Furthermore, a statement from the department claims that their system does not recognize faces, individuals, gender, or race. However, this does not address the concerns about what can be inferred from video recordings, such as tracing a person’s movements through vehicle tracking. The policy remains silent on this issue.

The department has two categories for data sharing: one for organizations accessing Fullerton’s data and another for those sharing data with it. These categories recognize that data moves in both directions but do not clarify the rules governing these relationships.

The term “retroactive search,” which allows looking up past data for crime-solving, does not specify how far back this search can go, leaving a crucial question about data retention unanswered. This missing information is essential for understanding privacy implications.

While the department provides transparency data and RIPA (Records and Information for Public Awareness) stops, these datasets cannot be combined effectively. The RIPA data notes reasons for stops but doesn’t allow for differentiation between stops initiated by ALPR (Automated License Plate Recognition) alerts and those based solely on officer observations. This oversight makes it impossible to confirm that hotlist alerts are human-verified.

Despite the department’s commitment to privacy and data-use limits, including no enforcement of immigration or traffic laws and promises of human verification, there is little evidence that it monitors these commitments. The Access Policy states that reasons for accessing data are logged indefinitely, but it does not confirm whether anyone reads these logs.

To enhance transparency, the department could share three key pieces of data: how long it keeps license plate readings, how many access log audits it performed last year, and how many hotlist hits were found to be incorrect after human review. This information would provide clearer insights into their data practices without revealing specific camera locations.

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